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REFUGEE RIGHTS:
THE NEW FRONTIER OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION
Bill Frelick
For four decades, a neat line dMded the human rights field from the
refugee field. That line was represented by international borders. The human
rights field was concerned almost exclusively with abuses of the rights of citizens
by their own governments or, occasionally, by nongovernmental entities
operating within the borders of states. By contrast, the refugee field came into
play only after persons fleeing persecution had crossed an international border.
The cause of flight was considered relevant only insofar as it provided a basis for
determining refugee status. Addressing the causes of refugee flows was
considered beyond the competence of agencies operating on behalf of refugees.
The neat division had its origins in the two documents that, in the
aftermath of World War II, defined the scope of human rights and the
international refugee regime: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' of
1948 and the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 .2 The
UDHR laid down its marker on behalf of refugees by declaring that "[e]veryone
has the rightto seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."
The Refugee Convention defined the term "refugee" as a person who, owing to
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
ofh/sna~na//b/and is unable or, owingto such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country.4
The UDHRconcemed basically itself with persecution within a person's
own country. Such persecution, or more specifically, the fear of such
persecution if returned, forms the basis of the refugee definition. The most
fundamental rights protection in the Refugee Convention concer-is safeguarding
refugees from being returned to a place where their life or freedom would be
° Senior Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for Refugees
Universal Dearation of Human Rights, GA res. 217A 111), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810,
(1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
2 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force April 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee
Convention].
3 UDHR, supra note I, art. 14(l) (emphasis added).
4 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. I (A)(2) (emphasis added).
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threatened.' -This is known as the principle of nonrefoulemen4 enshrined in
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, and now considered by many to be a
peremptory norm of customary international law."
During those four decades, the UN system clearly divided
responsibilities for human rights as distinct from responsibilities for refugee
protection and assistance. The first UN human rights mechanism was the
Commission on Human Rights, created in 1946, which reports to the General
Assembly through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).7  The
Commission generally meets only once a year. Its work is conducted largely
through special rapporteurs or working groups, such as the Special Rapporteur
on Torture orthe Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.' In 1993 the UN
also established a UN Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR).9 The
UNCHR is responsible for the UN Centre for Human Rights and for
coordinating the UN's human rights work.'0
s See id. art. 33 (enumerating the principle of nonrefoulement).
6 EXCOM, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, General Conclusion on
International Protection, No. 25 (XXXIII) (1982), (b) (noting that "the principle of non-
refoulement... was progressively acquiring the character of a peremptory rule of
international law.'); CARTEGENA DECLARATION ON REFUGEES, adopted by the Colloquium
on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexdco and Panama, 19-
22 Nov. 1994, sec. I1, para. 4, reprintedin II UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, COU.ECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS
GONCE NING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 206, 208 (Jean-Pierre Colombey ed.,
1995) (stating that the principle of non-refoulement should be acknowledged as a rule
ofjw cgers); GuYS. GOO DWN-GLL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 168, 201 (2d
ed. 1996); PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE DEFNITION AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISrIED 276 (1997).
7 See generally HOWARD TOILEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1I987).
See id. at 104-11; M. T. Kamminga, The Thematic Procedures of the UN
Commission on Human Ifghts, 34 NErH. INT'L. L REv. 299 (1987); David Weissbrodt,
The Three "heme"pedalRapporteurs ofthe UN Commission on Human RIght, 80
A.J.I.L 685 (1986).
9 Hn Commisbnerforthe promoion andprotecion ofall human ghts GG Res.
14 I, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 26 1, U.N. Doc. V48/49 (1993).
,o See generall United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rghts
<http://www.unhchr.ch/>.
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A distinct agency, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
was created on behalf of refugees in 1950." Its mandate defined refugees in
words identical to those that would appear a year later in the Refugee
Convention, specifying that a refugee is a person "outside the country of his
nationality' who is unwilling or unable to return owing to a well-founded fear of
persecution.'2 The Statute also specified that 'the Work of the High
Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character, it shall be
humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of
refugees."' 3
During the Cold War, the UN system was noteworthy for the
ineffectiveness of its human rights work. Criticism of member states was
frowned upon as interference in internal affairs. This principle is found in the UN
Charter, which asserts that the UN and its members may not intervene "in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."'14 The
heavy lifting in the human rights field was left largely in the hands of
nongovernmental organizations.
In contrast, the UNHCR was generally noted for its effectiveness, but
was careful to tread circumspectly outside the borders of refugee-producing
states. High Commissioners steered clear of commenting on the causes of
refugee flows, seeing such statements as inconsistent with the UNHCR's
mandate to be "entirely non-political."
Duringthattime, most of the world's refugees originated in communist
or communist-dominated states. UNHCR was perceived, with some
justification, as a creation and a tool of the West in the ideological struggle of the
Cold War. The widely accepted view of the world, at that time, was that neither
borders nor major ideologies would change. Despite rhetoric to the contrary,
most assumed that refugees were not likely to return to their countries of origin.
Hungarians, East Germans, Poles, Soviets, Cubans, Vietnamese, Cambodians,
Ethiopians, Afghans, and millions of others would either languish for years in
camps in neighboring countries or, if lucky, be resettled in third countries.
" Statute of the Offlce of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees; GA
Res. 428 (V), Annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 20 at 46, U.N. Doc. A 775 (1950)
[hereinafter Mandate of the UNHCR].
," Compare id. at 6(A)(i) (establishing competence of the High Commissioner to
persons "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted ... is outside the country of
his nationality .... ") WM Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. I (defining a refugee).
'" Mandate ofthe UNHCR, supra note II, 2.
4 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.
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UNHCR listed three "durable solutions," repatriation, local integration, or
resettlement to resolve the plight of refugees. Although UNHCR called
repatriation the preferred solution, in most cases it was not considered a viable
option because political changes would not occur sufficient to allow refugees to
return safely. Exile was presumed. And UNHCR's emphasis was on securing
asylum and on defending the rights of refugees in their host countries. Pressure
was exerted on "first asylum state?" to keep their borders open to allow refugees
to enter. A system of international burden sharing developed, with mixed
success, to provide incentives to those states to provide at least temporary
asylum pending a durable solution.
I. NEW WORLD ORDER: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
AND THE CHALLENGE TO ASYLUM
All that has changed since the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Borders are no longer considered sacrosanct.
New states have formed. The protective wall of the principle of noninterference
in the intemal aflairs ofotherstates, although still standing, has not been immune
from the changes in the world scene.
The first major post-Cold War refugee flow occurred in the immediate
aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. In pulling together the coalition to oppose
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, U.S. President George Bush
announced a "New World Order."5 Refugees did not fit the ideal of an orderly
world. In principle, the causes of refugee flows would be stopped and refugees
would be able to remain in their.home counties in safety and dignity. This also
comported nicely with the growing anti-immigrant mood in the affluent West,
the distaste for asylum seekers in their own countries, and the fear that millions
more could be on the way from the collapsed Soviet Union and the third world.
In the U.S. view, the experiences of Vietnam would not be repeated.
The Gulf War would not be drawn out. Nor would the war's aftermath;
neighboring allied countries would not be burdened by a continuing flow of
refugees for years afterthe cessation of hostilities. No longer would a Vietnam
or a Cuba, and now an Iraq, with impunity be permitted to force its citizens to
become refugees. No longerwould allies such as Thailand or Pakistan, and now
," See George Bush, Address Before ajoint Session ofthe Congress on the Cessation
ofthePersian GuffConflict, I PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: GEORGE BUSH 218 (199 1).
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Turkey, be pressured to keep their doors open and bear the burden of caring
for hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of refugees for year after year.
But could the United States, with or without the support of the world
community, alter the refugee-producing conditions in such states? All its efforts
to the contrary, Saddam Hussein remained crippled but in power, and still able
to persecute his own citizens. And persecute them he did.' 6 Hundreds of
thousands of Kurds fled his depredations. 7 Turkey closed its borders.' They
remained stranded on the mountainous frontier.
The U.S.-led coalition could have pressured Turkey to open its border.
It did not The coalition could have marched on Baghdad. It did not. The right
to seek asylum, declared in the UDHR,'9 was denied. But would the world
community sit back and watch mass refoulementbeing committed?
Anew approach was devised. Its basis is found in UN Security Council
Resolution 688, which marks a turning point in both the international refugee and
human rights regimes, marking their intersection in the country of origin. Its
result was the creation of a safe haven zone inside northern Iraq.
UN Resolution 688 is important both for what it does and does not say.
It frames its condemnation of Saddam Hussein's repression not in terms of the
human rights violations committed against Iraqi citizens inside Iraq, but in terms
of the "massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers"
caused by that repression.2 The concern is not primarily about Saddam's threat
to the Kurds of Iraq, it is a fear of the Kurds themselves-that their flight to other
countries will 'threaten international peace and security in the region."', This
opens the door under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for interference in the
internal affairs of Iraq.
Therefore, Resolution 688 should not be read as ushering in a new day
for human rights against government abuse of its citizens committed under the
umbrella of state sovereignty. On the contrary, the resolution affirms the
"sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all
16 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 146-49 (1992);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1992 651-92 (1992);
see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH &
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN IN IRAQI KURDISTAN (1993).-
'7 See U.S. COMMITTEE FORREFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1992 98-99 (1992).
'8 See id. at 82.
'9 UDHR, supra note 1, at aft. 14(I).
20 Id
21 /d
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States in the area."2'
But Resolution 688 did make a significant advance. It insisted that Iraq
"allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those
in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq.' In compliance with Resolution 688,
Iraq did conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UN
Secretary General's Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan on April 18
that allowed the UN to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it believed
necessary. The language of the MOU, perhaps more than Res. 688, could
provide a precedent for future involvement of the various arms of the United
Nations into internal affairs of states at the point at which human rights and
refugees intersect, the conditions that force people to flee their homes. The
MOU welcomed "United Nations efforts to promote the voluntary return home
of Iraqi displaced persons and to take humanitarian measures to avert new flows
of refugees and displaced persons from Iraq."
Resolution 688 had made a genuine advance by expressing the
consensus of the world community that international humanitarian organizations
should be allowed free access to assist within Iraq.
Citing Resolution 688 as justification, although it made no reference to
sending international troops into Iraq, Britain, France, and the United States
carved out a security zone in northern Iraq that would serve the dual function of
I) "protecting' Turkey from Iraqi Kurdish refugees by preventing them from
seeking asylum in Turkey, and 2) destabilizing the Iraqi regime by supporting the
development of a hostile, autonomous political and military entity within its
territory.
The rhetoric of Operation Provide Comfort was humanitarian, and it did
indeed provide relative safety for the Kurds of northern Iraq from Iraq's central
government forthe next several years. But it was not a case of politically neutral
humanitarianism. Safety was selective. Although Iraqi government forces were
kept at bay, Operation Provide Comfort provided no safety from incursions from
Turkey, which periodically launched attacks against its own Kurdish guerrillas
operating out of Iraq, on occasion hitting Iraqi Kurds, as well.
In 1996, seeingthe writing on the wall and realizing that the safe haven
could not be maintained indefinitely, one of the two strongest Kurdish factions,
the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), decided to strike a deal with Saddam
Hussein by inviting Iraqi government forces to bolster its side in a struggle with
22 Id
SId. at para. 3.
Vol. 4266
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the other majorfaction, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Although the
KDP's action seemed to be a blunder of the first magnitude, it was based on the
evidence of a diminishing commitment by the international community following
Turke/s reluctance to rnaintain the protective umbrella and a realization that the
international community, reiterated as early as Resolution 688, would never
challenge the ultimate sovereignty of Iraq over the Kurdistan region.
The borderwith Turkey remained dosed. Aside from a fewthousand
hand-picked persons with close ties to the United States, who were evacuated,
the rest remained trapped with no place to escape. As in 199 I, asylum outside
the country was denied. This time there was no semblance of protection inside
the country either.
The Gulf War also resulted in institutional changes within the UN
system. The Baghdad regime flagrantly obstructed humanitarian arms of the
United Nations attempt to fulfill Resolution 688. The most serious post-war
repression by Baghdad against its own citizens occurred in southern Iraq directed
against the "Marsh Arabs," a people living in the area where the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers merge. When Special Rapporteur Max Van der Stoel tried to
report to the Security Council on Iraqi human rights abuses in the marshlands,
in July 1992, he was allowed to speak only in his personal capacity. The Security
Council took no action on his report. The following year did Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali did not accept Van der Stoel's recommendation that UN
human rights monitors be sentto Iraq. Iraq prevented Van der Stoel's return by
denying him a visa.24
Responding to the lackluster performance of the UN in Iraq, In
December 1991 the General Assembly created a new mechanism, the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)?' The addition of DHA made no
discemable difference in the effectiveness of UN human rights monitoring or on
the response ofthe intemational community. Following the removal of UNHCR
and UN security personnel from southern Iraq, the remaining UN humanitarian
agencies, UNICEF and WFP, did not even ask the Baghdad government for
permission to visit the marshlands.26
24 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOST AGENDA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN FIELD
OPERATIONS 144 (1993).
2s GA Res. 46/182, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 49, U.N. Doc. AN46149
(1991).
2'Id, at 137.
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II. DANGEROUS uSAFE HAVEN": THE CASE OF BOSNIA
The refugee and human rights fields became completely interlocked in
Bosnia, another refugee-producing hot spot where "safe havens" were declared
to be part of the world's new response to potential refugee flows.
Although the UNHCR statute mandates that agency to work on behalf
of refugees outside their country of origin,27 UNHCR was designated as the lead
UN agency inside 'Bosnia to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to
about 1.3 million intemally displaced persons and an additional 1.4 million "war
affected" civilians. It will never be known how many of those 2.7 million people
would have left Bosnia and become "refugees" if they had been able to. The UN
High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, characterized her agencys role as providing
"preventive protection," which she explained as an attempt to attenuate the
causes of refugee flows. In her 1993 Note on International Protection, Ogata
said:
UNHCR has always insisted that its activities in countries of
origin are not incompatible with and must not in any way
undermine the institution of asylum or the individual's access to
safety. At the same time, the presence of UNHCR in a
country of origin in connection with prevention, humanitarian
assistance and/or solutions should not be taken to imply that
conditions there are safe or that persons fleeing that country
are not in need of international protection.'
There is no way of knowing for sure the extent to which the UNHCR
presence in Bosnia prevented more horrific human rights abuses than actually
occurred. t is arguable, however, that UNHCR's presence did serve to prevent
persons from seeking asylum and so did, in fact, undermine the institution of
asylum. Most civilians were not able to flee. One civilian, a Muslim from Serb-
controlled Banja Luka, expressed the reality of being trapped:
27 UNHCR Mandate, supra note II, at para. 6 (enumerating competence of the
UNHCR).
' Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Note on
International Protection (Submitted by the High Commissioner), 44th Sess., at para. 37,
NAC.96/815 (1993).
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[W]e are all in danger here. We are in the center of mass
crimes, pogroms and genocde .... What's really sad is that we
are alone, and we don't have any guns. The Western
countries will not defend us and will not allow us to defend
ourselves....
There is really only one answer. We must leave. If we don't,
we will die. You know, ifthe mayor announced that the road
to Zagreb was open, but that we could only go on foot,
everyone would go. Muslims, Croats, women, children,
grandmothers. I don't think that I can escape by running over
that hill. If I thought I could, I would do it at once. Everybody
would.29
Soon after the conflict in Bosnia erupted, one European state after
another began imposing visa restrictions on Bosnians. One commentator
observed, "By sealing all escape routes and means of refuge, European
governments are trapping refugees and displaced people in besieged cities and
regions and placing them in the crossfire between warring forces."'  With no
observable political will from the international community to intervene to stop
the killing or to allow escape, the UN was sent in to provide humanitarian
assistance to the civilians trapped inside Bosnia.
As the chief operational aim of the UN on the ground evolved into a
feeding operation, and without sufficient international military might even to
deliver food wherever and whenever the need arose, UN officials had to
sacrifice important protec.n principles in order to keep lines open for
assistance. This meant making deals with the thugs who controlled checkpoints
in and out of besieged areas. As 1992 drew to a dose, UNPROFOR soldiers
delivering humanitarian assistance were under orders to prevent would-be
refugees from leaving besieged Sarajevo. 'They cry, they plead with us for help
to cross. They even offer us money," a French UNPROFOR soldier told the
29 PErERlv4s, LOVETHYNEIGHBOR:ASTORYOFWAR75-76 (1996) (quoting Muharem
Krzi).
30 GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARrrY INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL
REFUGEE CRISIS 164 (1993).
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Washington Post3 ' "But we're under orders to stop them. 2 The Postreported
that 500 people a night were being caught trying to cross the airport tarmac that
lay across a potential escape route from Sarajevo to Butmir, and relative safety.33
With access to asylum outside Bosnia unavailable for all but a narrowly
limited number of new arrivals, the international community sought to provide
eithersome modicum of protection inside Bosnia or, at least, the appearance of
a modicum of protection. UNHCR protection officers struggled valiantly to
prevent human rights abuses, radically transforming their traditional role in the
process, but given UNHCR's limited tools, of which were devoted to providing
humanitarian assistance, promoting human rights in Bosnia duringthe war was
a losing proposition. Reluctantly, the international humanitarian agencies found
themselves with so few options that they promoted the designation of "safe
haven zones" inside Bosnia, even though many had grave doubts that the
international community had the political will to guarantee their safety. In
December 1992, the ICRC issued a rare and dramatic statement calling for the
creation of safe zones inside Bosnia, saying: "As no third country seems to be
ready, even on a provisional basis, to grant asylum to one hundred thousand
Bosnian refugees, an original concept must be devised to create protected zones
... which are equal to the particular requirements and the sheer scale of the
problem." 4
The ICRCs rationale for advocating a protected zone inside Bosnia was
quite instructive. It was a last ditch attempt to wrest some form of protection on
behalf of Bosnians after it had become clear that asylum outside the country of
persecution would not be an option for most of them.
The will to protectthem was lacking, despite repeated warnings by the
United Nations' Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights that
UNPROFOR and UNHCR were "unable adequately to protect the affected
population and in many circumstances are helpless to prevent violations of
31 Peter Maas, U.N. Keepers of the Siege: Relief Troops Bar Escape from Sara/evo,
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1992, atAl.
32 Id
3 See id.
" Bill Frelick, Preventing Refugee Row: Protection or Peril?, in WORLD REFUGEE
SUVEY, 1993 5, II (U.S. Comm. for Refugees ed. 1993) (quoting ICRC statement); see
alSo INTERNATIONAL COMMI-rEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 93 (1992) (noting
that ICRC President Sommaruga, in an address to the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, "pleaded for better protection of the civilian population in situ, if
necessary by creating specially protected areas.").
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human rights.'" s The Special Papporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, followed that
warning, in 1992, with many more.36  They went unheeded. By 1993
Mazowiecki was threatening to resign rather than be placed in the role of
"disguisingthe helplessness of international organizations. °7 Finally, in July 1995,
in the aftermath of the fall of the first designated safe area, Srebrenica, and the
massacre of thousands from that area, Mazowiecki resigned?8
III. INTOTHE FUTURE
UNHCR has crossed the line that once separated the human rights and
refugee fields. UNHCR and the nongovernmental agencies working on behalf
of refugees are firmly inside countries of origin. In complex emergencies
UNHCR, for all its limitations, has proven itselfto be among the most robust and
capable of the UN agencies in the defense of human rights.
The challenge, as UNHCR looks beyond Bosnia, is to strike the balance
that Sadako Ogata spoke of in 1993. UNHCR and the rest of the refugee field
must remain more vigilant than ever in defending the right to asylum and in
confronting states that show a willingness to compromise that right Not all signs
in this regard are positive. As the safe haven in northern Iraq was going sour,
UNHCR gave little indication that it was gearing up in any serious way either to
extend protection inside northern Iraq in order to attenuate the causes of
refugee flight or to bolster its presence at the Turkish border to monitor the
treatment of asylum seekers at the border. As Turkish officials refused to admit
would-be Kurdish asylum seekers, nary a word was heard in protest from
UNHCR.
' Report on the situation ofhuman rghts in the territory of the former Yugos/avia
submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowieclk Speial Rgpporteur of the Commission on
Human R'ghts, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Commission resoluion 1992/S-I/I of 14
August 1992, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, I st Spec. Sess., Agenda Item 3, 56,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S- I/9 (1992).
" See generally, Jeane irkpatrick, Op-Editorial, A Matter of Princip/e at the U.N.,
WASH. POsT, Aug. 18, 1995, at A25.
" "Mazowiecki Threatens to Resign Commission," PAP Warsaw, February 10, 1993,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-EEU-93-027, Feb. I I, 1993, at 30.
' See Philippe Naughton, U.N. Prober Finds Serbs May Have Massacred Bosnian
MuS/ms, WASH. PosT, Aug. 24, 1995, at A2 1; Kirkpatrick, supra note 36.
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UNHCR for the foreseeable future appears as though it will be
operating on both sides of borders during refugee emergencies. As it develops
its capacity as a human rights monitoring and intervening, agency inside countries
where gross human rights abuses are occurring, while balancing that role with
one of providing humanitarian assistance, it must seek to remain attentive to the
human rights of refugees after they have crossed borders. Security in refugee
camps, protection for women and children, procuring identity and travel
documents, seeking rights of free expression, association, religion, culture, and
education will be as challenging as ever.
The solutions for refugees remain essentially the restoration of rights.
In traditional terms, as mentioned above, the three solutions were voluntary
repatriation, local integration, or resettlement. The first solution restores the
rights in the country of origin that were lost through being forced into alienage.
The second two solutions, local integration and resettlement, extend rights
formerly enjoyed in the country of origin to a new state. If one of the principal
New World Order solutions is prevention, it must be clear that this too must
involve the restoration or preservation of these same rights. There can be no
compromise. And ifthese rights cannot be enjoyed in the country of origin, the
victim has the right to flee to seek those rights elsewhere.
The High Commissioner has coined the term "right to remain" as a
shorthand for what she is hoping to accomplish. Itseems a lofty rightto defend,
although interestingly the UDHR is silent on this right.3 9 This new "right' has
become a slogan, but its implications are not fully understood. When
governments are almost universally resistant to providing asylum to refugees,
when doors are closing at every border, the "right to remain" can be seen as a
rationale for the denial of asylum. Guidance is needed on this as well as on
UNHCRPs evoMng view of repatriation.
As mentioned above, duringthe Cold War, repatriation was usually not
viewed as a viable option. Now, it often appears to be the only option. During
the Cold War, when speaking of durable solutions, the terms 'voluntar/' and
"repatriation" were inextricablyjoined. Now, they have been delinked. UNHCR
speaks openly of"imposed return." In a recent paper entitled UNHCR Strategy
towards2000, UNHCRanticipates future involvement in such repatriations and
outlines its role as a protector of human rights in the context of involuntary
repatriation: intra/, ensuringthatthe returees are treated in accordance with
' The UDHR speaks only of the right to leave and the right to return. See UDHR,
supranote I,art. 13(2).
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human rights standards, and not subjected to any kind of persecution or
discrimination. But the loss of voluntariness is conceded. Ultimately, refugees
are fundamentally situated to determine when they feel it is safe, or not safe, to
return. It appears thatthe element of refugee choice is being compromised both
with respect to the right to leave and the right to return. The only right being
upheld is the "right to remain." That right becomes suspect.
In a series of consultations with NGOs, UNHCR has committed itself
to forging a doserworking relationship with the NGO community. Wih respect
to human rights these consultations, called PARinAC (Partnership in Action),
included a specific recommendation:
There is a need to document and expose cases of human
rights violations against displaced women, children, elderly
people, persons forcibly recruited by armed forces, as well as
members of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and
indigenous people. UNHCRand NGOs should take action to
monitor, report and to counter human rights violations, and
should adopt measures to provide adequate protection to
victims of violence. The involvement of organizations in the
above-mentioned groups should be sought. UNHCR and
NGOs should cooperate with the relevant human rights
mechanisms in this respect.40
So far so good. But more is needed. NGOs need to be watchdogs not
only of governments, but of UNHCR as well. UNHCR is not just another
human rights organization with a human rights mandate. It has a refugee-specific
mandate. Thus far, its entry into the human rights field, welcome in many
respects, not least because of the weakness of the UN's human rights
mechanisms, also has presented cause for concern. NGOs fear that UNHCR
has made compromises with its protection mandate through involvement in
delivering humanitarian assistance in countries of origin, through involvement
with prevention efforts, and in a number of recent repatriation exercises.
Fundamentally, the organization's commitment to the right of persecuted people
to seek asylum is now coming into question. NGOs want to welcome UNHCR
as a new and strong ally in the human rights field. However, NGOs worry that
they may be losing their strongest and most important ally in the refugee field.
40 PARnAC, OSLO PLAN OFACTION, 20 (1994) (Recommendation No. 50).
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Balancing its work on both sides of the border, and at the border as well, is
UNHCR's greatest challenge as it approaches the year 2000. Our job, as
NGOs, is to help it to maintain that balance.
